
A Formal Measure of Machine Intelligence

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Abstract

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this measure formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense.

1. Introduction

Most of us think that we recognise intelligence when we see it, but we are not really sure how to precisely define or measure it. We informally judge the intelligence of others by relying on our past experiences in dealing with people. Naturally, this naive approach is highly subjective and imprecise. A more principled approach would be to use one of the many standard intelligence tests that are available. Contrary to popular wisdom, these tests, when correctly applied by a professional, deliver statistically consistent results and have considerable power to predict the future performance of individuals in many mentally demanding tasks. However, while these tests work well for humans, if we wish to measure the intelligence of other things, perhaps of a monkey or a new machine learning algorithm, they are clearly inappropriate.

One response to this problem might be to develop specific kinds of tests for specific kinds of entities; just as intelligence tests for children differ to intelligence tests for adults. While this works well when testing humans of different ages, it comes undone when we need to measure the intelligence of entities which are profoundly different to each other in terms of their cog-

nitve capacities, speed, senses, environments in which they operate, and so on. To measure the intelligence of such diverse systems in a meaningful way we must step back from the specifics of particular systems and establish the underlying fundamentals of what it is that we are really trying to measure. That is, we need to establish a notion of intelligence that goes beyond the specifics of particular kinds of systems.

The difficulty of doing this is readily apparent. Consider, for example, the memory and numerical computation tasks that appear in some intelligence tests and which were once regarded as defining hallmarks of human intelligence. We now know that these tasks are absolutely trivial for a machine and thus do not test the machine's intelligence. Indeed even the mentally demanding task of playing chess has been largely reduced to brute force search. As technology advances, our concept of what intelligence is continues to evolve with it.

How then are we to develop a concept of intelligence that is applicable to all kinds of systems? Any proposed definition must encompass the essence of human intelligence, as well as other possibilities, in a consistent way. It should not be limited to any particular set of senses, environments or goals, nor should it be limited to any specific kind of hardware, such as silicon or biological neurons. It should be based on principles which are sufficiently fundamental so as to be unlikely to alter over time. Furthermore, the intelligence measure should ideally be formally expressed, objective, and practically realisable.

This paper approaches this problem in the following way. In *Section 2* we consider a range of definitions of human intelligence that have been put forward by well known psychologists. From these we extract the most common and essential features and use them to create an informal definition of intelligence. *Section 3* then introduces the framework which we use to construct our formal measure of intelligence. This framework is formally defined in *Section 4*. In *Section 5* we use our developed formalism to produce a formal definition of intelligence. *Section 7* closes with a short summary.

A preliminary sketch of the ideas in this paper appeared in the poster (Legg & Hutter, 2005). It can be shown that the intelligence measure presented here is in fact a variant of the Intelligence Order Relation that appears in the theory of AIXI, the provably optimal universal agent (Hutter, 2004). A long journal version of this paper is being written in which we give the proposed measure of machine intelligence and its relation to other such tests a much more comprehensive treatment.

Naturally, we expect such a bold initiative to be met with resistance. However, we hope that the reader will appreciate the value of our approach: With a formally precise definition put forward we aim to better our understanding of what is a notoriously subjective and slippery concept.

2. The concept of intelligence

Although definitions of human intelligence given by experts in the field vary, most of their views cluster around a few common perspectives. Perhaps the most common perspective, roughly stated, is to think of intelligence as being the ability to successfully operate in uncertain environments by learning and adapting based on experience. The following often quoted definitions, which can be found in (Sternberg, 2000), (Wechsler, 1958), (Bingham, 1937) and (Gottfredson, 1997), all express this notion of intelligence but with different emphasis in each case:

- “The capacity to learn or to profit by experience.” – W. F. Dearborn
- “Ability to adapt oneself adequately to relatively new situations in life.” – R. Pinter
- “A person possesses intelligence insofar as he has learned, or can learn, to adjust himself to his environment.” – S. S. Colvin
- “We shall use the term ‘intelligence’ to mean the ability of an organism to solve new problems. . . .” – W. V. Bingham
- “A global concept that involves an individual’s ability to act purposefully, think rationally, and deal effectively with the environment.” – D. Wechsler
- “Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience.” – L. S. Gottfredson and 52 expert signatories

These definitions have certain common features; in some cases they are explicitly stated, while in others they are more implicit. Perhaps the most elementary feature is that intelligence is seen as a property of an entity which is interacting with an external environment, problem or situation. Indeed this much is common to practically all proposed definitions of intelligence. As we will be referring back to these concepts regularly, we will refer to the entity whose intelligence is in question as the *agent*, and the external environment, problem or situation that it faces as the *environment*. An environment could be a large complex world in which the agent exists, similar to the usual meaning, or something as narrow as a game of tic-tac-toe.

The second common feature of these definitions is that an agent’s intelligence is related to its ability to succeed in an environment. This implies that the agent has some kind of an objective. Perhaps we could consider an agent intelligent, in an abstract sense, without having any objective. However without any objective what so ever, the agent’s intelligence would have no observable consequences. Intelligence then, at least the concrete kind that interests us, comes into effect when an agent has an objective to apply its intelligence to. Here we will refer to this as its *goal*.

The emphasis on learning, adaption and experience in these definitions implies that the environment is not fully known to the agent and may contain surprises and new situations which could not have been anticipated in advance. Thus intelligence is not the ability to deal with one fixed and known environment, but rather the ability to deal with some range of possibilities which cannot be wholly anticipated. This means that an intelligent agent may not be the best possible in any specific environment, particularly before it has had sufficient time to learn. What is important is that the agent is able to learn and adapt so as to perform well over a wide range of specific environments.

Although there is a great deal more to this topic than we have presented here, the above brief analysis gives us the necessary building blocks for our informal working definition of intelligence:

Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.

We realise that some researchers who study intelligence will take issue with this definition. Given the diversity of views on the nature of intelligence, a debate which is still being fought, this is unavoidable. Nevertheless, we are confident that our proposed informal working definition is fairly mainstream. We also believe that our definition captures what we are

interested in achieving in machines: A very general and flexible capacity to succeed when faced with a wide range of problems and situations. Even those who subscribe to different perspectives on the nature and correct definition of intelligence will surely agree that this is a central objective for anyone wishing to extend the power and usefulness of machines. It is also a definition that can be successfully formalised.

3. The agent-environment framework

In the previous section we identified three essential components for our model of intelligence: An agent, an environment, and a goal. Clearly, the agent and the environment must be able to interact with each other; specifically, the agent needs to be able to send signals to the environment and also receive signals being sent from the environment. Similarly the environment must be able to receive and send signals to the agent. In our terminology we will adopt the agent's perspective on these communications and refer to the signals from the agent to the environment as *actions*, and the signals from the environment as *perceptions*.

What is missing from this setup is the goal. As discussed in the previous section, our definition of an agent's intelligence requires there to be some kind of goal for the agent to try to achieve. This implies that the agent somehow knows what the goal is. One possibility would be for the goal to be known in advance and for this knowledge to be built into the agent. The problem with this however is that it limits each agent to just one goal. We need to allow agents which are more flexible than this.

If the goal is not known in advance, the other alternative is to somehow inform the agent of what the goal is. For humans this is easily done using language. In general however, the possession of a sufficiently high level of language is too strong an assumption to make about the agent. Indeed, even for something as intelligent as a dog or a cat, direct explanation will obviously not work.

Fortunately there is another possibility. We can define an additional communication channel with the simplest possible semantics: A signal that indicates how good the agent's current situation is. We will call this signal the *reward*. The agent's goal is then simply to maximise the amount of reward it receives, so in a sense its goal is fixed. This is not limiting though as we have not said anything about what causes different levels of reward to occur. In a complex setting the agent might be rewarded for winning a game or solving a difficult puzzle. From a broad perspective then, the goal is flexible. If the agent is to succeed in its




Figure 1. The agent and the environment interact by sending action, observation and reward signals to each other.

environment, that is, receive a lot of reward, it must learn about the structure of the environment and in particular what it needs to do in order to get reward.

Not surprisingly, this is exactly the way in which we condition an animal to achieve a goal: by selectively rewarding certain behaviours. In a narrow sense the animal's goal is fixed, perhaps to get more treats to eat, but in a broader sense this may require doing a trick or solving a puzzle.

In our framework we will include the reward signal as a part of the perception generated by the environment. The perceptions also contain a non-reward part, which we will refer to as *observations*. This now gives us the complete system of interacting agent and environment in Figure 1. The goal, in the broad flexible sense, is implicitly defined by the environment as this is what defines when rewards are generated. Thus in this framework, to test an agent in any given way, it is sufficient to fully define the environment.

In artificial intelligence, this framework is used in the area of reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998). By appropriately renaming things, it also describes the controller-plant framework used in control theory. It is a widely used and very general structure that can describe seemingly any kind of learning or control problem. The interesting point for us is that this type of framework follows naturally from our informal definition of intelligence. The only difficulty was how to deal with the notion of success, or profit. This requires the existence of some kind of objective or goal, and the most flexible and elegant way to bring this into our framework is by using a simple reward signal.

4. A formal framework for intelligence

Having made the basic framework explicit, we can now formalise things. See (Hutter, 2004) for a more complete technical description along with many more example agents and environments.

The agent sends information to the environment by sending *symbols* from some finite set, for example, $\mathcal{A} := \{\textit{left}, \textit{right}, \textit{forwards}, \textit{backwards}\}$. We will call this set the *action space* and denote it by \mathcal{A} . Similarly, the environment sends signals to the agent with symbols from a finite set called the *perception space*, which we will denote \mathcal{P} . The *reward space*, denoted by \mathcal{R} , will always be a finite subset of the rational unit interval $[0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$. Every perception consists of two separate parts; an observation and a reward. For example, we might have $\mathcal{P} := \{(\textit{cold}, 0.0), (\textit{warm}, 1.0), (\textit{hot}, 0.3), (\textit{roasting}, 0.0)\}$.

To denote symbols being sent we will use the lower case variable names a , o and r for actions, observations and rewards respectively. We will also index these in the order in which they occur, thus a_1 is the agent's first action, a_2 is the second action and so on. The agent and the environment will take turns at sending symbols, starting with the environment. This produces a history of observations, rewards and actions which we will denote by, $o_1 r_1 a_1 o_2 r_2 a_2 o_3 r_3 a_3 o_4 \dots$. Our restriction to finite action and perception spaces is deliberate as an agent should not be able to receive or generate information without bound in a single cycle in time. Of course, the action and perception spaces can still be extremely large, if required.

Formally, the agent is a function, denoted by π , which takes the current history as input and chooses the next action as output. A convenient way of representing the agent is as a probability measure over actions conditioned on the current history. Thus $\pi(a_3 | o_1 r_1 a_1 o_2 r_2)$ is the probability of action a_3 in the third cycle, given that the current history is $o_1 r_1 a_1 o_2 r_2$. A deterministic agent is simply one that always assigns a probability of 1 to some action for any given history. How the agent produces the distribution over actions for any given history is left completely open. Of course in artificial intelligence the agent will be a machine and so π will be a computable function.

The environment, denoted μ , is defined in a similar way. Specifically, for any $k \in \mathbb{N}$ the probability of $o_k r_k$, given the current history $o_1 r_1 a_1 \dots o_{k-1} r_{k-1} a_{k-1}$, is $\mu(o_k r_k | o_1 r_1 a_1 \dots o_{k-1} r_{k-1} a_{k-1})$. For the moment we will not place any further restrictions on the environment.

Our next task is to formalise the idea of “profit” or “success” for an agent. Informally, we know that the agent must try to maximise the amount of reward it receives, however this could mean several different things.

Example. Define the reward space $\mathcal{R} := \{0, 1\}$, an action space $\mathcal{A} := \{0, 1\}$ and an observation space that

just contains the null string, $\mathcal{O} := \{\varepsilon\}$. Now define a simple environment,

$$\mu(r_k | o_1 \dots a_{k-1}) := 1 - |r_k - a_{k-1}|.$$

As the agent always get a reward equal to its action, the optimal agent for this environment is clearly $\pi_{opt}(a_k | o_1 \dots r_k) := a_k$. Consider now two other agents for this environment, $\pi_1(a_k | o_1 \dots r_k) = \frac{1}{2}$ and

$$\pi_2(a_k | o_1 \dots r_k) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } a_k = 0 \wedge k \leq 100, \\ 1 & \text{for } a_k = 1 \wedge 100 < k \leq 5000, \\ \frac{1}{2} & \text{for } 5000 < k, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For $1 \leq k \leq 100$ the expected reward per cycle for π_1 is higher than it is for π_2 . Thus in the short term π_1 is the most successful. On the other hand, for $100 < k \leq 5000$, π_2 has switched to the optimal strategy of always guessing that 1 head will be thrown, while π_1 has not. Thus in the medium term π_2 is more successful. Finally, for $k > 5000$, both agents use random actions and thus in the limit they are equally successful.

Which is the better agent? If you want to maximise short term rewards, it is agent π_1 . If you want to maximise medium term rewards, then it is agent π_2 . And if you only care about the long run, both agents are equally successful. Which agent you prefer depends on your temporal preferences, something which is currently outside of our formulation.

The standard way of formalising this in reinforcement learning is to assume that the value of rewards decay geometrically into the future at a rate given by a discount parameter $\gamma \in (0, 1)$, that is,

$$V_\mu^\pi(\gamma) := \frac{1}{\Gamma} \mathbf{E} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \gamma^i r_i \right) \quad (1)$$

where r_i is the reward in cycle i of a given history, the normalising constant is $\Gamma := \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \gamma^i$, and the expected value is taken over all histories of π and μ interacting. By increasing γ towards 1 we weight long term rewards more heavily, conversely by reducing it we balance the weighting towards short term rewards.

Of course this has not actually answered the question of how to weight near term rewards versus longer term rewards. Rather it has simply expressed this weighting as a parameter. While that is adequate for some purposes, what we would like is a single test of intelligence for machines, not a range of tests that vary according to some free parameter. That is, we would like the temporal preferences to be included in the model, not external to it.

One possibility might be to use harmonic discounting, $\gamma_t := \frac{1}{t^2}$. This has some nice properties, in particular the agent needs to look forward into the future in a way that is proportional to its current age (Hutter, 2004). However an even more elegant solution is possible.

If we look at the value function in Equation 1, we see that geometric discounting plays two roles. Firstly, it normalises the total reward received which makes the sum finite, in this case with a maximum value of 1. Secondly, it weights the reward at different points in the future which in effect defines a temporal preference. We can solve both of these problems, without needing an external parameter, by simply requiring that the total reward returned by the environment cannot exceed 1. For a reward summable environment μ we can now define the value function to be simply,

$$V_{\mu}^{\pi} := \mathbf{E} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} r_i \right) \leq 1. \quad (2)$$

One way of viewing this is that the rewards returned by the environment now have the temporal preference factored in and thus we do not need to add this. The cost is that this is an additional condition that we place on the environments. Previously we required that each reward signal was in a finite subset of $[0, 1] \cap \mathbb{Q}$, now we have the additional constraint that the sum is bounded.

It may seem that there is a philosophical problem here. If an environment μ is an artificial game, like chess, then it seems fairly natural for μ to meet any requirements in its definition, such as having a bounded reward sum. However if we think of the environment μ as being “the universe” in which the agent lives, then it seems unreasonable to expect that it should be required to respect such a bound. The flaw in this argument is that a “universe” does not have any notion of reward for particular agents.

Strictly speaking, reward is an interpretation of the state of the environment. In humans this is built in, for example, the pain that is experienced when you touch something hot. In which case, maybe it should really be a part of the agent rather than the environment? If we gave the agent complete control over rewards then our framework would become meaningless: The perfect agent could simply give itself constant maximum reward. Indeed humans cannot easily do this either, at least not without taking drugs designed to interfere with their pleasure-pain mechanism.

Thus the most accurate framework would consist of an agent, an environment and a separate goal system that interpreted the state of the environment and rewarded the agent appropriately. In such a set up the

bounded rewards restriction would be a part of the goal system and thus the above philosophical problem does not occur. However for our current purposes it is seem sufficient just to fold this goal mechanism into the environment and add an easily implemented constraint to how the environment may generate rewards.

5. A formal measure of intelligence

We have now formally defined the space of agents, how they interact with each other, and how we measure the performance of an agent in any specific environment. Before we can put all this together into a single performance measure, we firstly need to define what we mean by “a wide range of environments.”

As our goal is to produce a measure of intelligence that is as broad and encompassing as possible, the space of environments used in our definition should be as large as possible. Given that our environment is a probability measure with a certain structure, an obvious possibility would be to consider the space of all probability measures of this form. Unfortunately, this extremely broad class of environments causes problems. As the space of all probability measures is uncountably infinite, we cannot list the members of this set, nor can we always describe environments in a finite way.

The solution is to require the environmental measures to be computable. Not only is this necessary if we are to have an effective measure of intelligence, it is also not all that restrictive. There are an infinite number of environments in this set, with no upper bound on their complexity. Furthermore, it is only the measure which describes the environment that must be computable. For example, although a typical sequence of 1’s and 0’s generated by flipping a coin is not computable, the probability measure which describes this process is computable. Thus, even environments which behave randomly are included in our space of environments. This appears to be the largest reasonable space of environments. Indeed, no physical system has ever been shown to lie outside of this set. If such a physical system was found, it would overturn the Church-Turing thesis and alter our view of the universe.

How can we combine the agent’s performance over all these environments? As there are an infinite number of environments, we cannot simply take a uniform distribution over them. Mathematically, we must weight some environments more highly than others. If we consider the agent’s perspective on the problem, this question is the same as asking: Given several different hypotheses which are consistent with the data, which hypothesis should be considered the most likely? This is a frequently occurring problem in inductive infer-

ence where we must employ a philosophical principle to decide which hypothesis is the most likely. The most successful approach is to invoke the principle of Occam’s razor: Given multiple hypotheses which are consistent with the data, the simplest should be preferred. This is generally considered the rational and intelligent thing to do.

Consider for example the following type of question which commonly appears in intelligence tests. There is a sequence such as 2, 4, 6, 8, and the test subject needs to predict the next number. Of course the pattern is immediately clear: The numbers are increasing by 2 each time. An intelligent person would easily identify this pattern and predict the next digit to be 10. However, the polynomial $2k^4 - 20k^3 + 70k^2 - 98k + 48$ is also consistent with the data, in which case the next number in the sequence would be 58. Why then do we consider the first answer to be more likely? It is because we use, perhaps unconsciously, the principle of Occam’s razor. Furthermore, the fact that the test defines this as the correct answer shows that it too embodies the concept of Occam’s razor. Thus, although we don’t usually mention Occam’s razor when defining intelligence, the ability to effectively use Occam’s razor is clearly a part of intelligent behaviour.

Our formal measure of intelligence needs to reflect this. Specifically, we need to test the agents in such a way that they are, at least on average, rewarded for correctly applying Occam’s razor. Formally, this means that our a priori distribution over environments should be weighted towards simpler environments. The problem now becomes: How should we measure the complexity of environments?

As each environment is computable, it can be represented by a program, or more formally, a binary string $p \in \mathbb{B}^*$ on some prefix universal Turing machine \mathcal{U} . Thus we can use Kolmogorov complexity to measure the complexity of an environment $\mu \in E$,

$$K(\mu) := \min_{p \in \mathbb{B}^*} \{|p| : \mathcal{U}(p) \text{ computes } \mu\}.$$

This measure is independent of the choice of \mathcal{U} up to an additive constant that is independent of μ , thus, we simply pick one universal Turing machine \mathcal{U} and fix it. The correct way to turn this into a prior distribution is by taking $2^{-K(\mu)}$. This is known as the algorithmic probability distribution and it has a number of important properties, particularly in the context of universally optimal learning agents. See (Li & Vitányi, 1997) or (Hutter, 2004) for an overview of Kolmogorov complex and universal prior distributions.

Putting this all together, we can now define our formal measure of intelligence for arbitrary systems. Let E be the space of all programs that compute environmental

measures of summable reward with respect to a prefix universal Turing machine \mathcal{U} , let K be the Kolmogorov complexity function. The intelligence of an agent π is defined as,

$$\Upsilon(\pi) := \sum_{\mu \in E} 2^{-K(\mu)} V_{\mu}^{\pi} = V_{\xi}^{\pi},$$

where $\xi := \sum_{\mu \in E} 2^{-K(\mu)} \mu$ due to the linearity of V . ξ is the Solomonoff-Levin universal a priori distribution generalised to reactive environments.

6. Properties of the intelligence measure

To better understand the performance of this measure consider some example agents.

A random agent. The agent with the lowest intelligence, at least among those that are not actively trying to perform badly, would be one that makes uniformly random actions. We will call this π^{rand} . In general such an agent will not be very successful as it will fail to exploit any regularities in the environment, no matter how simple they are. It follows then that the values of $V_{\mu}^{\pi^{\text{rand}}}$ will typically be low compared to other agents, and thus $\Upsilon(\pi^{\text{rand}})$ will be low.

A very specialised agent. From the equation for Υ , we see that an agent could have very low intelligence but still perform extremely well at a few very specific and complex tasks. Consider, for example, IBM’s Deep Blue chess supercomputer, which we will represent by π^{dblue} . When μ^{chess} describes the game of chess, $V_{\mu^{\text{chess}}}^{\pi^{\text{dblue}}}$ is very high. However $2^{-K(\mu^{\text{chess}})}$ is small, and for $\mu \neq \mu^{\text{chess}}$ the value function will be low relative to other agents as π^{dblue} only plays chess. Therefore, the value of $\Upsilon(\pi^{\text{dblue}})$ will be very low. Intuitively, this is because Deep Blue is too inflexible and narrow to have general intelligence.

A general but simple agent. Imagine an agent that does very basic learning by building up a table of observation and action pairs and keeping statistics on the rewards that follow. Each time an observation that has been seen before occurs, the agent takes the action with highest estimated expected reward in the next cycle with 90% probability, or a random action with 10% probability. We will call this agent π^{basic} . It is immediately clear that many environments, both complex and very simple, will have at least some structure that such an agent would take advantage of. Thus for almost all μ we will have $V_{\mu}^{\pi^{\text{basic}}} > V_{\mu}^{\pi^{\text{rand}}}$ and so $\Upsilon(\pi^{\text{basic}}) > \Upsilon(\pi^{\text{rand}})$. Intuitively, this is what we would expect as π^{basic} , while very simplistic, is surely more intelligent than π^{rand} .

A simple agent with more history. A natural extension of π^{basic} is to use a longer history of actions, observations and rewards in its internal table. Let $\pi^{2\text{back}}$ be the agent that builds a table of statistics for the expected reward conditioned on the last two actions, rewards and observations. It is immediately clear $\pi^{2\text{back}}$ is a generalisation of π^{basic} by definition and thus will adapt to any regularity that π^{basic} can adapt to. It follows then that in general $V_{\mu}^{\pi^{2\text{back}}} > V_{\mu}^{\pi^{\text{basic}}}$ and so $\Upsilon(\pi^{2\text{back}}) > \Upsilon(\pi^{\text{basic}})$, as we would intuitively expect.

In a similar way agents of increasing complexity and adaptability can be defined which will have still greater intelligence. However with more complex agents it is usually difficult to theoretically establish whether one agent has more or less intelligence than another. Nevertheless, it is hopefully clear from these simple examples that the more flexible and powerful an agent is, the higher its machine intelligence.

A human. For extremely simple environments, a human should be able to identify their simple structure and exploit this to maximise reward. For more complex environments however it is hard to know how well a human would perform without experimental results.

Super-human intelligence. It can be easily proven that the theoretical AIXI agent (Hutter, 2004) is the maximally intelligent agent with respect to Υ . AIXI has been proven to have many universal optimality properties, including being Pareto optimal and self-optimising in any environment in which this is possible for a general agent. Thus it is clear that agents with very high Υ must be extremely powerful.

In addition to sensibly ordering many simple learning agents, this formal definition has many significant and desirable properties:

Valid. The most important property of a measure of intelligence is that it does indeed measure “intelligence”. As Υ formalises a mainstream informal definition, we believe that it is a valid measure.

Meaningful. An agent with a high Υ value must perform well over a very wide range of environments, in particular it must perform well in almost all simple environments. If such an agent existed, it would clearly be very powerful and practically useful. It also sensibly orders the intelligence of simple learning agents.

Repeatable. We can test an agent using the Υ repeatedly without problem. This is because it is defined across all well defined environments, not just a specific test subset which an agent might adapt to.

Absolute. Υ gives us a single real absolute value, unlike the pass-fail Turing test (Turing, 1950). This is important if we want to make distinctions between similar

learning algorithms that are not close to human level intelligence.

Wide range. As we have seen, Υ can measure performance from extremely simple agents right up to the super powerful AIXI agent. Other tests cannot handle such an enormous range.

General. The test is clearly non-specific to the implementation of the agent as the inner workings of the agent is left completely undefined. It is also very general in terms of what senses or actuators the agent might have as all information exchanged between the agent and the environment takes place over basic Shannon like communication channels.

Dynamic. One aspect of our test of intelligence is that it is, in the terminology of intelligence testing, a highly dynamic test (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). Normally intelligence tests for humans only test the ability to solve one-off problems. There are no dynamic aspects to the test where the test subject has to interact with something and learn and adapt their behaviour accordingly. This makes it very hard to test things like the individual’s ability to quickly pick up new skills and adapt to new situations. One way to overcome these problems is to use more sophisticated dynamic tests. In these tests there is an active tester who constantly interacts with the test subject, much like what happens in our formal intelligence measure.

Unbiased. The test is not weighted towards ability in certain specific kinds of areas or problems, rather it is simply weighted towards simpler environments no matter what they are.

Fundamental. The test is based on the theory of information, Turing computation and complexity theory. These are all fundamental ideas which are likely to remain very stable over time irrespective of changes in technology.

Formal. Unlike many tests of intelligence, Υ is completely formally, mathematically, specified.

Objective. Unlike the Turing test which requires a panel of judges to decide if an agent is intelligent or not, Υ is free of such subjectivity.

Our definition of intelligence also has some weaknesses. One is the fact that the environmental distribution $2^{-K(\mu)}$ that we have used is invariant, up to a multiplicative constant, to changes in the reference machine \mathcal{U} . While this affords us some protection, it still means that the relative intelligence of agents can change if we change our reference machine. One approach to this problem might be to limit the complexity of the reference machine, for example by limiting its state-symbol complexity. We expect that for highly intelligent ma-

chines that can deal with a wide range of environments of varying complexity, the effect of changing from one simple reference machine to another will be minor. For agents which are less complex than the reference machine however, such a change could be significant.

A theoretical problem is that our distribution over environments is not computable. While this is fine for a theoretical definition of intelligence, it makes the measure impossible to directly implement. The solution is to use a more tractable measure of complexity such as Levin's Kt complexity (Levin, 1973), or Schmidhuber's Speed prior (Schmidhuber, 2002). Both of these consider the complexity of an algorithm to be determined by both its description length and running time. Intuitively it also makes good sense, because we would not usually consider a very short algorithm that takes an enormous amount of time to compute, to be a particularly simple one.

The only closely related work to ours is the C-Test (Hernández-Orallo, 2000). While our intelligence measure is fully dynamic and interactive, the C-Test is a purely static sequence prediction test similar to standard IQ tests for humans. The C-Test always ensures that each question has an unambiguous answer in the sense that there is always one consistent hypothesis with significantly lower complexity than the alternatives. Perhaps this is useful for some kinds of tests, but we believe that it is unrealistic and limiting. Like our intelligence test, the C-Test also has to deal with the problem of the incomputability of Kolmogorov complexity. By using Levin's Kt complexity, the C-Test was able to compute a number of test problems which were used to test humans. The "compression test" (Mahoney, 1999) for machine intelligence is similarly restricted to sequence prediction. We consider the linguistic complexity tests of Treister-Goren et. al. to be far too narrow. The psychometric approach of Bringsjord and Schimanski is only appropriate if the machine has a sufficiently human-like intelligence.

7. Conclusions

Given the obvious significance of formal definitions of intelligence for research, and calls for more direct measures of machine intelligence to replace the problematic Turing test and other imitation based tests (Johnson, 1992), very little work has been done in this area. In this paper we have attempted to tackle this problem head on. Although the test has a few weaknesses, it also has many unique strengths. In particular, we believe that it expresses the essentials of machine intelligence in an elegant and powerful way. Furthermore, more tractable measures of complexity should lead to practical tests based on this theoretical model.

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